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ABSTRACT 
We examine whether the information contained in social media (Twitter 
& Facebook) and web search queries (Google) influences financial 
markets. Using a multivariate system and focussing on Eurozone’s 
peripheral countries, the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain), we show that social media discussion and search-related queries 
for the Greek debt crisis provide significant short-run information 
primarily for the Greek-German government bond yield differential even 
when other financial control variables (default risk, liquidity risk and 
international risk) are accounted for, and to a much lesser extent for 
Portuguese and Italian sovereign yield differentials. 
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Tweets, Google Trends and Sovereign 
Spreads in the GIIPS 
 
1. Introduction 
Social media have progressively become a popular open forum for 
analysing economic/financial topics and a field where the public 
sentiment is reflected in real time. They are widely used by influential 
economic commentators, policymakers and their followers. For instance, 
2008 Nobel Laureate in Economics and New York Columnist Paul 
Krugman had, at the time of writing, 1,083,072 Twitter account 
followers, whereas International Monetary Fund Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde had 146,805 Twitter followers. Further, “hot” 
economic topics like the (ongoing) Eurozone crisis and the Greek debt 
crisis are covered and discussed in great detail by dedicated websites 
(for instance in the The Wall Street Journal and The Financial Times). It 
has been argued that this “storehouse” of precious information might be 
contributing to the explanation of upcoming movements in financial 
markets (Geoffrey, 2012 for volatility; Pan et al. 2012, for investors’ 
attention and stock price, Da et al., 2011; for investors’ overreaction, 
Joseph et al., 2011 for abnormal returns). On April 18th 2013, Financial 
Times commentator Gillian Tett noted that investors can track 
investment returns with growing precision by plugging into social 
media.1 A recent fake tweet reflects the power of social media and the 
cost of inaccurate information in an era where the speed at which 
information travels is unprecedented. A fake tweet on April 23rd 2013 
                                                 
1 Gillian Tett on “Markets Insight: Wake up to the Twitter effect on markets”, The Financial 
Times, April 18, 2013. 
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from a hacked Associated Press account (asserting that explosions at the 
White House had injured Barack Obama) wiped more than $130 billion 
off the value of the S&P 500.2  In fact, it has been suggested that 
financial markets are more strongly influenced by negative press rumors 
than by fundamentals (see Hasan et al., 2012).  
This paper examines the impact of the volume of activity in social media 
(Twitter & Facebook) and web search queries (Google Trends) on the 
sovereign spread between the GIIPS (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, 
Spain) and the German long-term government bond yield during the 
Greek debt crisis. As the Greek crisis escalated, the term “Grexit” 
(Greece’s exit from the single currency) was added to the financial 
vocabulary. During this period, the Greek spread rose to unprecedented 
levels contributing further to the risk of contagion in Eurozone’s other 
peripheral countries. Greece, which was bailed-out twice (for €110bn in 
2010 and then again for €109bn in 2011), negotiated, in February 2012, 
a new €130bn rescue package involving a voluntary haircut of some 
53.5% on the face value of its bonds held by the private sector. Eurozone 
ministers agreed (in November 2012) to cut Greece’s debt by a further 
€40bn. Ireland was bailed-out for €85bn in November 2010. Portugal 
was bailed-out for €78bn in May 2011. Spain was granted, in July 2012, 
financial assistance from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for up 
to €100bn. Despite the bail-outs, international markets remain volatile 
and worried that the debt levels of all GIIPS could be unsustainable (this 
is reflected, for instance, on Spanish and Italian government yields that 
                                                 
2 (The Economist; see http://www.economist.com/news/finance-and-economics/21576671-
hacked-tweet-briefly-unnerves-stockmarket-newscrashrecover). 
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are still elevated) posing a risk to the entire Eurozone. 3 These concerns 
appear justifiable as the GIIPS account for around 34.3% of Eurozone’s 
GDP (Italy is the third and Spain is the fourth largest Eurozone 
economies) and run both current account deficits and high debt-to-GDP 
ratios. Italy accounts for 17.3% of Eurozone GDP. Spain accounts for 11% 
of Eurozone GDP, whereas Greece, Portugal and Ireland account for 
2.3%, 1.9%, and 1.8% of Eurozone GDP, respectively (Eurostat). 
To examine the impact of the volume of activity in social media (Twitter 
& Facebook) and web search queries (Google Trends) on the sovereign 
spreads in the GIIPS, we use the frequency domain causality test of 
Breitung and Candelon (2006). This econometric framework provides the 
following advantages: (i) it distinguishes between short-run and long-run 
causality, (ii) it allows the identification of causal relationships even if 
the true interdependence between two variables is non-linear in nature, 
(iii) it allows us to condition upon a set of relevant variables avoiding this 
way potential spurious causality inference, and (iv) the test is valid in the 
presence of volatility clusters, a common characteristic of financial 
variables. We demonstrate that social media discussion and search-
related queries for the Greek debt crisis provide significant information 
for explaining the spread (difference) between the cost of borrowing in 
Eurozone’s peripheral bond market and Germany over and above the 
information provided by other financial control variables (idiosyncratic 
default risk, liquidity risk and international risk). Our main findings are 
                                                 
3 Following from the pledge of European Central Bank President Mario Draghi to do 
“whatever it takes” to save the Euro (in July 2012), the European Central Bank approved (in 
September 2012) a plan paving the way for the bank to make unlimited purchases in struggling 
euro members' bond markets (such as Italy and Spain) with the aim of lowering their 
government bond yields. The plan was conditional on struggling governments to sign up to a 
euro-zone program of budgetary discipline. 
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summarized as follows: First, there is neither short-run nor long-run 
causality running from the Greek spread to social media/search queries. 
Second, we identify short-run causality from social media/search queries 
to the Greek spread.  Third, there is some weak (and information-set 
sensitive) evidence of predictability of Greek-debt related social 
media/search queries for Portuguese and Italian spreads; a possible 
reason for this finding is that the current exposure of Portuguese and 
Italian banks to Greek debt is higher than the exposure of Irish or 
Spanish banks. Unsurprisingly, as the Greek debt crisis evolved and 
Greek creditworthiness took a hit, the market price of Greek debt 
declined rapidly and consequently, banks exposed to Greek debt 
witnessed a weakening in their balance sheets. At the same time, the 
lower market price of Greek debt had an adverse impact on the value of 
collateral banks needed to secure wholesale funding and triggered 
margin calls requiring the posting of additional collateral. This form of 
contagion from Greece to Portugal and Italy might reflect the most likely 
answer (at the time of writing) to the question “who is next?”. Fourth, 
Twitter/Facebook provides stronger evidence of significance in high 
frequencies relative to Google (search queries); this might be because 
Twitter (in particular) has become a very popular way of keeping track of 
news and directing “followers” to news analysis (e.g. in blogs) in an 
extremely speedy way.  
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 discusses the data and 
methodology. Section 3 reports our empirical results. Section 4 discusses 
our findings and provides some concluding remarks. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1. Data description 
We use daily time-series data related to the Greek crisis over the period 
from 05/20/2011 to 05/09/2013 (495 observations). The search queries 
index (G) for key phrases related to Greek debt crisis has been retrieved 
from Google Trends (http://www.google.com/trends/; see Fig. 1). These 
phrases are: “Greek crisis”, “Greek debt crisis”, “Greece crisis”, “Greek 
debt” and “Grexit”. Note that in twitter #grexit was associated with the 
Greek crisis and it was not possible to retrieve keywords in twitter. Hash 
tags (#) were available only in twitter. Fig. 2 plots the Twitter (#Grexit) 
and Facebook hits (appearances) (T) for the keyword Grexit; these cover 
the period from 09/01/2012 to 05/09/2013 (170 observations; our data 
source is: http://analytics.peoplebrowsr.com/)4. We assess the impact of 
both variables above on the sovereign spread (Sj) between the 10-year 
government bond yield in Eurozone peripheral country j (j = Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain) and the German government bond yield 
(available from Datastream; see Fig. 3).5, 6 To do so, we condition on a 
number of controls: default risk, liquidity risk and international risk. We 
proxy the default risk (Dj) by the difference between the 10-year Credit 
Default Swap (CDS) premia in country j and the 10-year German CDS 
premia (available from Datastream; see Fig. 4). To proxy the default risk 
of Greece, we use the difference between the equally weighted sum of 
the 10-year Credit Default Swap (CDS) premia for two major Greek banks 
                                                 
4 Note that the sample was determined by the data availability. 
5 Nonlinear unit root tests (Kapetanios et al., 2003) provide evidence of stationarity for G, T 
and Sj (available upon request). 
6 One might argue that GARCH effects might be present in the sovereign spreads (Fig. 3). 
Bodart and Candelon (2009) demonstrate that the methodology we are employing in this 
study is not sensitive to the presence of volatility clustering. 
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(Alpha Bank and National Bank of Greece) and the 10-year German CDS 
premia. Greek debt restructuring (in February 2012) triggered the 
payment of Greek CDS in March 2012. Since then, these series has been 
discontinued. For this reason, we use the CDS information on Greece’s 
two major banks which are positively correlated (0.58) with the Greek 
CDS. 
Lack of attention towards liquidity risk has been cited by the President of 
the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston Eric Rosengren (2010) as one of the 
reasons explaining why the seriousness of the recent financial crisis was 
underestimated by economic forecasters; in fact, liquidity considerations 
have become a central issue in the literature only recently (see e.g. 
Angelini et al., 2011; Naes et al., 2011). We proxy liquidity risk (Lj; see 
Fig. 5) using the differential between the bid-ask spread of the 10-year 
bond in country j and the bid-ask spread of the 10-year German bond 
(see e.g. De Santis, 2012; Arghyrou and Kontonikas, 2012; Favero et al., 
2010). Following De Santis (2012) and Schwarz (2010), we also use (from 
Bloomberg) the spread between the 10-year KfW (Kreditanstalt für 
Wiederaufbau) bond yield and the 10-year German government bond 
yield as a proxy for the Eurozone area common risk factor (E); see Fig. 5. 
KfW are German agency bonds. These bonds are less liquid than the 
federal government ones; however, KfW bonds carry the same default 
risk as they are fully guaranteed by the German federal government. 
Therefore, any difference should reflect “flight-to-liquidity” and “flight-
to-safety” considerations. We follow Arghyrou and Kontonikas (2012) in 
proxying international risk by the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
volatility index (VIX); this measures the implied volatility of S&P 500 
index options. As an alternative and broader measure, we use the 
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Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis financial stress index (FSI) which is a 
composite index of 18 financial variables (including VIX); see Fig. 6. FSI is 
available at a weekly frequency; we convert the series to daily frequency 
using the quadratic-match average method. The method fits a local 
quadratic polynomial for each observation of the low frequency series, 
and then uses this polynomial to fill in all observations of the high 
frequency series associated with the period.7  
2.2. Methodology  
For the structural bivariate system 
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7 See http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/net/NETJan2010Appendix.pdf.  
8 This is due to the assumption that the variance-covariance matrix is a positive definite.  
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(5) To assess the validity of (5) for frequencies ω  that range within (0, ) , 
B&C compare the obtained statistic with the 0.05 critical value of the 
2  
distribution with 2 degrees of freedom.  
Hosoya (2001) proposed a method that eliminates from the variables of 
interest the one way feedback due to a third variable, while the initial 
feedback structure remains invariant. For instance,10 in the trivariate 
system ( , , )t t t tz x y m   let tw  denote the projection residual vector 
                                                 
9 Given that sin( ) 0k ω in the cases where 0ω and ω , it comes that the second 
restriction in (3) is simply disregarded.  
10 In this study, we condition upon four variables. For presentation purposes, we discuss the 
conditioning approach using one variable. The extension to additional variables is 
straightforward. 
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obtained by projecting tm  into the Hilbert space 1 2( , , , ,...)t t t tH x y z z  . 
Similarly, let t  and t  represent the projection residual vectors 
obtained by projecting tx  and ty , respectively, into Hilbert space 
1( , ,...)t tH w w  . After the described transformation, Hosoya (2001) argues 
that a higher order conditional causality measure can be expressed 
equivalently by the bivariate causality measure  / (ω) (ω)y x mM M   . 
3. Empirical results 
Following section’s 2 notation, tx  refers to the target variable while ty  
refers to the causing variable. Depending on the examined hypothesis 
each time, target or causing variable may be one of the Sj, G or T. Finally, 
the tm  vector, upon which we condition, includes proxies for 
idiosyncratic default risk (Dj), liquidity risk (Lj), Eurozone risk (E) and 
international risk (VIX or FSI).  
Using the B&C test, we disentangle short- and long-run predictability 
among the variables of interest. Results for Greece (with and without 
conditioning) are presented in Figs. 7-10 and summarized in Table 1. The 
null hypothesis of no predictability running from G towards SGreece is 
rejected for the B&C measure (bold line), at the 0.05 significance level, 
when ω[0.78π, π] [0.10π, 0.69π], (Fig. 7). This implies that medium 
size and high frequencies of G (short-run cyclical components), with 
wave lengths of less than 2.56 days (2π/ω=6.28/2.45=2.56) as well as 
between 2.89 and 20.26 days, are those that offer predictive power with 
respect to SGreece. When the B&C test is re-conducted, after the Hosoya’s 
(2001) conditioning approach, the revealed predictability pattern is 
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comparable to the bivariate case irrespective of which international risk 
proxy is employed (VIX or FSI). The joint range of frequencies in which 
predictability is supported, correspond to cyclical components with wave 
lengths of less than 2.26 days (ω[0.88π, π]) and between 3.22 and 
15.32 days (ω [0.31π, 0.61π]). Raggedly, it can be argued that the 
short-run cyclical components of G series with wave lengths of less than 
two weeks are capable of offering additional information with respect to 
the future movements of SGreece. At the same time there is no evidence 
of long-run causality. On the other hand, the null hypothesis of no 
causality at the opposite direction is rejected for the entire range of 
frequencies. The latter also holds when conditioning takes place (see Fig. 
9).   
The same testing procedure (with and without conditioning; with the 
same control variables) is implemented to the Twitter & Facebook hits 
(appearances) in order to assess its impact on the Greek spreads. The 
non-Granger causality hypothesis running from T to SGreece, is rejected for 
the B&C measure (bold line) at the 0.05 significance level when ω
[0.76π, π], (Fig. 8). The abovementioned range of frequencies 
corresponds to wave lengths of less than 2.63 days. Therefore, only 
short-run causality is established. Similar pattern as above, with 
relatively larger range of frequencies, contributing significantly in the 
prediction of SGreece, is uncovered under the Hosoya’s (2001) conditioning 
approach. The joint range of frequencies with significant causality 
coincides with the range of the bivariate unconditioned case, that is ω
[0.76π, π]. Again, we find no credible empirical evidence to support the 
reverse hypothesis; the same holds even when we condition upon the 
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set of variables included in tm  (see Fig. 10). Comparing Figs. 7 and 8, we 
note that Twitter & Facebook provide more pronounced evidence of 
short-run predictability in terms of significance relative to Google 
(search queries); we return to this issue in the next section. 
Figs. 11-18 report our findings for the remaining GIIPS whereas a 
summary of all results for the GIIPS is reported in Table 1. We find feeble 
and non-systematic evidence of short-run predictability of the 
Twitter&Facebook variable (only for the case without conditioning) of up 
to 2.65 days for the 10-year spread in Portugal (see Fig. 17) and 
qualitatively similar evidence of short-run to medium-run predictability 
(with reference to the Google variable and conditioning when the VIX is 
used) of between 2.92 and 3.93 days for Italy (see Fig. 12). Hence, there 
is sporadic evidence of predictability (sensitive to the information set 
used) for Portugal (which, like Greece, is a relatively small Eurozone 
economy) and Italy. It goes without saying that these results should be 
treated with caution. A potential explanation for our findings is that at 
the time of the Portuguese bailout, Portuguese banks, followed by 
Italian banks, had a higher exposure to Greek public and private debt 
than any of the remaining GIIPS. Indeed, Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) data showed that in June 2011, Portuguese banks had 
some $10.08bn exposure (or 6.73% of their total exposure around the 
world) followed by a $3.88bn exposure (or 0.40% of total exposure) for 
Italian banks, $0.77bn (or 0.21% of total exposure) for Irish banks and 
$1.22bn (or 0.1% of total exposure) for Spanish banks. Following the 
Greek debt restructuring, the exposure to Greek debt was reduced; yet, 
Portuguese banks, followed by Italian banks, remained more exposed to 
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Greek debt than the others. According to the latest BIS data (published 
in June 2013), the exposure of Portuguese banks to Greek debt had 
dropped, in December 2012, to $7.34bn (or 6.16% of their total 
exposure around the world). The exposure of Italian banks to Greek debt 
had dropped to $1.0bn (or 0.12% of total exposure), for the Irish banks 
to $0.11bn (or 0.07% of total exposure) and for the Spanish banks to 
$0.76bn (or 0.05% of total exposure). This argument is in line with the 
evidence of Mink and de Haan (2013) who rely on an event study 
approach and employ daily data to identify significant effects of news 
about the Greek bailout on stock price returns in European banks 
(irrespective of their exposure to the remaining GIPS; the definition of 
Mink and De Haan excludes Italy). They also find that that news about 
the Greek economic situation and the Greek bailout has led to abnormal 
returns on sovereign bonds for the GIPS with a larger impact in the case 
of Portugal and a lower impact in the case of Ireland and Spain. 
To sum up, we show that Greek debt crisis related information in social 
media (Twitter & Facebook) and web search queries (Google) does 
influence financial markets. This is mainly so for Greece, and to a much 
lesser extent for Portugal and Italy.  This could be viewed as a weak 
signal of contagion from Greece to (some of) the remaining GIIPS in the 
sense that social media discussion and search queries related to the 
Greek debt crisis carry some predictive information for the cost of 
borrowing in other peripheral Eurozone economies. Noting that 
economists disagree on the definition of contagion and how it can be 
empirically tested (see Corsetti et al., 2011), our Greek-debt related 
Twitter/Facebook and Google Trends variables arguably comply with the 
thinking of Mink and de Haan (2013) who refer to contagion in terms of 
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country-specific events and their impact on the asset prices of other 
countries.  
Given that the data used in our case are unwrought, further qualitative 
elaboration may be of fathomless importance in revealing more clearly 
the true linkage between Greek-debt related social media/search 
queries and GIIPS spreads. With this in mind, our work, which relies on 
the B&C test, differs from recent work by Arghyrou and Kontonikas 
(2012) who use monthly data to identify contagion effects in terms of a 
significant direct and positive effect from the Greek spread on other 
Eurozone sovereign spreads and more so for the remaining GIIPS (with 
the effect being stronger for Ireland and Portugal), or recent work by De 
Santis (2012) who identifies contagion effects in terms of the direct 
impact of a Greek credit rating downgrade on other Eurozone sovereign 
spreads (the impact is again stronger for Portugal and Ireland). Our work 
also differs from Beetsma et al. (2013) who construct 
macroeconomic/financial news variables about the GIIPS (using 
information from the newsflash of Eurointelligence; an independent 
internet-based service which provides daily morning euro-area news 
briefings of the European media) to conclude that bad news has 
increased sovereign yield differentials in the GIIPS and has triggered 
spillover effects to non-GIIPS countries. Finally, we also note the work of 
Di Cesare et al. (2013) who argue that recent movements in Eurozone 
spread differentials have increased to levels above those justified by 
economic fundamentals. Di Cesare et al. (2013) construct a monthly 
index of search volume of euro break-up keywords (“end of euro”, “end 
of the euro”, “euro break-up”, “euro break”) and note that this index has 
a strong positive correlation of 0.77 with the residual part of the 10-year 
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Italian spread, that is, the part not explained by economic fundamentals 
(such as the deficit-to-GDP ratio, expected growth, the volatility of 
stocks in the banking sector and the volatility of the Italian spread). 
4. Discussion and concluding remarks 
This paper examines the long and short-run causality between Google 
Trends (search queries) and Twitter/Facebook (social media) data 
related to the Greek debt crisis and sovereign spreads in the GIIPS. We 
have four main findings. First, there is neither short-run nor long-run 
causality running from the Greek spread to social media/search queries. 
Second, we identify short-run causality from social media/search queries 
to the Greek spread. Our evidence remains strong even when a number 
of financial controls are accounted for. This might be due to the fact that 
spreads, social media/search queries and controls are all driven by the 
same unknown underlying process (for instance, expectations could play 
an important role). Third, there is some sporadic (and information-set 
sensitive) evidence of predictability of Greek-debt related social 
media/search queries for Portuguese and Italian spreads (but not for 
Spanish or Irish spreads). Fourth, Google (search queries) carries 
different short-run predictive information relative to Twitter/Facebook. 
Although Google (search queries) is used by a wider base, 
Twitter/Facebook have both become a very popular way of keeping 
track of news and directing “followers” to news analysis (e.g. in blogs) in 
an extremely speedy way; this might explain why Twitter/Facebook 
provides (primarily for the Greek spread and to a lesser extent for the 
Portuguese spread) more pronounced evidence of short run 
predictability in terms of significance relative to Google (search queries). 
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In fact, Twitter and Facebook do not necessarily function in the same 
way; Twitter is much more likely to get people to click through on links 
(Carr, 2010).  Because of its broader mix of sources for news links, 
Twitter provides expanded knowledge compared to Facebook. Last but 
not least, Facebook users track with the general population very closely 
whereas Twitter users are more educated.11 
A frequently made assumption is that the relationship between 
information demand and risk aversion is a positive one (see for instance 
Eeckhoudt and Godfroid 2000). Although opposite views to the latter 
have been expressed, in this paper we take the view that increased 
social media attention for the Greek crisis is considered as “bad news” 12 
and drive up spreads on the grounds that it reflects increased concerns 
about Greek debt sustainability and the future of the Eurozone. A 
contrasting view is that social media might push spreads down if it 
reflects increased optimism about European support measures to 
prevent Greece from defaulting; in addition social media attention can 
be a response to endogenous events such as jumps in the Greek 
sovereign spread. Figure 1 provides more support for the former since 
we do observe that the three highest values of the Google Index appear 
in periods where increased uncertainty arises (the first one when the 
referendum was announced, the second one when the Greek parliament 
had to approve austerity measures and the last one during the Greek 
                                                 
11 Facebook users get the majority (70%) of the News links from Family/Friends and only a 
tiny share (13%) from News organizations or Journalists; contrast this with Twitter users who 
get 36% of News links from Family/Friends and as much as 27% from News organizations or 
Journalists. For more detailed information, including statistics on differences in education, 
see e.g. Mitchell et al. (2012). 
12 Alternatively, frequently used terms include “animal spirits”, “market psychology” and 
self-reinforcing waves of pessimism and optimism (see the theoretical framework proposed 
by Angeletos and La’O, 2013).  
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elections).  The evidence we provide implicitly assumes the following 
order: increased social media/search queries activity implies higher risk 
which results in a higher spread (clearly the reverse does not hold)13. 
This very issue is arguably a hostage to fortune. Indeed, it suggests that 
the more policymakers talk about the Greek debt crisis, and hence the 
more the social media refer to it, the more spreads will rise. A similar 
argument was put forward by David Smith, Economics Editor of The 
Sunday Times. Commenting on the launch of the Bank of England's new 
‘uncertainty gauge’, which pools information from a set of financial 
market indicators and the number of press articles citing economic 
uncertainty, Smith noted that as policymakers intensify their talk about 
uncertainty, journalists write more about it which, in turn, adds further 
to uncertainty and damages economic growth (Smith, 2013). 
Overall, our empirical results suggest that unwrought data, effortlessly 
traced in social media, enclose valuable information content with 
respect to the short-run movements of financial markets. We do not 
argue that the frequency of searches/appearances of a particular term is 
comparable to a sentiment index; rather, we flag the issue that it offers 
unexploited information which can be further utilized for improving our 
understanding of financial markets. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 Vlastakis and Markelos (2012) confirm empirically for US stocks that investors demand 
more information as their level of risk aversion increases.  
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Table 1: How social media predicts 10-year sovereign spreads (Sj). 
Country 
j 
 
Predictability 
without 
conditioning 
 
Predictability with 
conditioning (FSI) 
 
Predictability with 
conditioning (VIX) 
Panel A: Google search queries predict Spreads (G→ Sj ). All numbers refer to days. 
 
Greece  ≤2.56 & [2.89-
20.26] 
 ≤2.26 & [3.22-15.32]  ≤2.33 & [3.12-
20.26] 
       
Ireland          
       
Italy         [2.92-3.93] 
       
Portugal           
       
Spain          
Panel B: Twitter & Facebook hits predict Spreads (T→ Sj ). All numbers refer to 
days. 
Greece  ≤2.63  ≤2.84  ≤2.89 
       
Ireland          
       
Italy           
       
Portugal  ≤2.65       
       
Spain          
 
Note: The table reports the Breitung and Candelon (2006) predictability test without/with 
Hosoya’s (2001) conditioning.  G refers to the Google search queries index for “Greek crisis”, 
“Greek debt crisis”, “Greece crisis”, “Greek debt” and “Grexit”. T refers to Twitter & 
Facebook hits for “Grexit”.  denotes absence of predictability. VIX refers to the Volatility 
Index and FSI to a Financial Stress Index. 
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Figure 1. The Google search queries index 
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Note: PSI refers to Private Sector Involvement in the restructuring of Greek debt (February 
2012). Greece, which was bailed-out twice (for €110bn in 2010 and then again for €109bn in 
2011) negotiated, in February 2012, a new €130bn rescue package involving a voluntary 
haircut of some 53.5% on the face value of its bonds held by the private sector. Eurozone 
ministers agreed (in November 2012) to cut Greece’s debt by a further €40bn. 
 
 
Figure 2. Twitter & Facebook hits Figure 3. GIIPS spreads  
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Figure 4. GIIPS default indices   Figure 5. GIIPS liquidity risk & 
Eurozone risk factor  
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Note: In Fig. 5, liquidity risk (Lj) for country j is defined in terms of the percentage Bid-Ask 
spread: 
 
100* 100*
0.5*( ) 0.5*( )
j j Germany Germany
j j Germany Germany
Ask Bid Ask Bid
Ask Bid Ask Bid
    
           , where Ask and Bid refer to the Ask and Bid 
price of the 10-year government bond. 
 
Figure 6. Financial Stress index & VIX index 
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Figure 7. G → SGreece  Figure 8. T → SGreece 
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Note: In Fig. 7 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the 
B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using VIX is 8, 9 and 8, respectively. Similarly, in Fig. 8 the VAR lag length is 8, 5 
and 5, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 9. SGreece → G Figure 10. SGreece → T 
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Note: In Fig. 9 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the 
B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using VIX is 8, 8 and 7, respectively. Similarly, in Fig. 10 the VAR lag length is 8, 9 
and 9, respectively.  
 
  
  24 
Figure 11. G → SIreland  Figure 12. G → SItaly 
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Note: In Figs. 11-12, the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, 
the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using VIX is 6 in every case.  
 
 
Figure 13. G → SPortugal Figure 14. G → SSpain 
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Note: In Fig. 13 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the 
B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using VIX is 7, 8 and 8, respectively. Similarly, in Fig. 14 the VAR lag length is 8 in 
every case.  
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Figure 15. T → SIreland Figure 16. T → SItaly 
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Note: In Figs. 15-16, the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, 
the B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using VIX is 3 in every case.  
 
Figure 17. T → SPortugal Figure 18. T → SSpain 
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Note: In Fig. 17 the VAR lag length implemented for the derivation of the B&C measure, the 
B&C measure after Hosoya’s conditioning using FSI and the B&C measure after Hosoya’s 
conditioning using VIX is 6, 6 and 5, respectively. Similarly, in Fig. 18 the VAR lag length is 3 in 
every case. 
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